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Abstract:
Following outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Turkey recorded an unprecedented 
inflow of migrants from its southern neighbourhood. The policy of opened borders in 
the initial years of war contrasted to securitization, the search for international support 
and other similar policies, which countries usually adopt in cases of migration crises. 
However, rising numbers of Syrian migrants, the deterioration of Turkish relations with 
the Assad government and the engagement of the Kurds as another important party in 
the Syrian conflict resulted in the switch of the Turkish border policy. In 2014, President 
Erdoğan initiated the construction of over 800 km long barrier on the border with Syria 
with an aim to build similar fenced walls on the Iraqi and Iranian border in 2017. Main 
aim of this paper is to analyze the development of the Turkish border policy (particularly 
concerning the border with Syria) in the aftermath of the 2011 events in the Middle East 
and identify factors, which led up to the shift from the policy of welcoming to the policy 
of building „Fortress Turkey”. 
The first part of the paper will briefly summarize Turkish migration policy and focus 
on presenting the change of the initial ‘open’ approach to migration from Syria into the 
current state of building fences in the borderland. Subsequently, the paper will deal with 
selected factors, which might have caused this phenomenon. These include spread of 
terrorism and inflow of the Daesh fighters, who were using soft border regime to diffuse 
their activities to the Turkish territory; increase in smuggling and cross-border illegal 
trade; fears from the conflict spillover; but also territorial integrity concerns with regard 
to revival of the Kurdish activities in the region2.
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Introduction
After an outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, the Government of 
Turkey adopted the policy of open-doors towards Syrian refugees3 and announced 
that „people approaching Turkey’s borders from the conflict in Syria would be 
allowed to cross the border and admitted to Turkey, as opposed to being intercepted 
or halted“ (AIDA 2017: 1). Yet, already in January 2016, Turkey introduced new 
visa policy towards Syrians entering Turkish territory from other states and later 
on that year, the Government initiated construction of the wall along the entire 
911 km long border with Syria to stop and control movement of people between 
the two countries. The wall is a continuation of the barrier already existing in some 
border regions of Turkey created in 2014 and the government expects completion 
of the barrier by the end of 2017. It will be three metres high; two metres wide; 
made of seven tonne concrete blocks topped with a razor wire; with 120 border 
towers; a security road on the Turkish side with regular military patrols, ditches 
and surveillance cameras with night vision capability on the most vulnerable 
sites (Uğurlu 2016: 1). Besides the wall with Syria, Turkey has announced to erect 
similar constructions along some sections of its border with Iran and along the 
entire border with Iraq in May 2017. The construction of the barrier with Iran 
has already begun and in its final stage, it should cover 144 km out of the 499 km 
Turkey-Iran border. First segments of the barrier have been built in the north-
eastern part of the borderline in provinces Iğdır and Ağrı. (MMP 2017a: 9) The 
3 For the purpose of this paper, we will use the term „refugee” and „refugee population” for 
any person from abroad, who came to Turkey to seek any form of international protection. 
Yet, in reality, most of these people are not „refugees” according to international law and 
Turkish domestic legislation. Turkey is a party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status 
of Refugees (Geneva Convention), but keeps its geographic limitation. This means, that the 
refugee status can be granted only to asylum applicants fleeing from persecution following 
events that happened in Europe. Regarding this exception and further domestic legislation, 
there are four basic types of protection that Turkey grants to the people in need. Individually 
arriving asylum seekers can be granted (AIDA 2015: 15-18):
 refugee status – granted in accordance with the Geneva convention from 1951 and its 
geographic limitation to the applicants from the European countries
 conditional refugee status - granted in accordance with the Geneva convention from 1951 
and its geographic limitation to the applicants from the non-European countries
 subsidiary protection status - based on subsidiary protection definition as stated in the 
EU Qualification directive 2011-95-EU to the applicants, who can’t return to their home 
countries because of a threat of violence, torture or death penalty, regardless of geographic 
limitation of nationality or citizenship.
 Mass influx population (meaning asylum seekers with Syrian citizenship) can be granted:
 temporary protection - formalized by the Regulation on Temporary Protection from 22 
October 2014.
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aforementioned development implies a significant turn of both Turkish migration 
and border policy and marks a change of the meaning and function of borders – 
from areas of contact to the barrier lines. (Bolečeková 2013: 566-567) Thus, while 
the Turkish government claims its „open door” policy continues, in practice it 
has ended. 
Main research question of the presented paper is formulated as follows: 
What are the factors influencing change of the Turkish border policy from the 
concept of open-borders to building border walls? The paper seeks for answer 
by applying a selective approach and analysing three dimensions of the topic. 
First, geopolitical issue and the question of territorial integrity and sovereignty 
of Turkey, which are closely linked with the Kurdish separatism and territorial 
claims in the Hatay region. Second, security related issues, particularly spread 
of terrorism and organized crime in the region; illegal border crossings of the 
Daesh fighters coming to Turkey; but also domestic insurgencies and street clashes 
between migrants and Turkish population. And third, foreign policy related issues, 
which include the Turkish relations with Syria; the Turkish NATO membership; 
terms of the EU-Turkish Statement and activities of international community 
in the area; which creates a tension between state-centric security concerns on 
one hand and pressure towards globalization and Europeanization of the Turkish 
migration policy that tends to be simultaneously progressive and restrictive, on 
the other hand.
Methodology of the paper is derived from the political metaphor analysis 
as a type of the figurative discourse tool, which can be anticipated pursuant to the 
title of the text. Construction of the border walls is a common way of how states react 
in situations of mass migration inflows (Hungary-Serbia barrier in 2015), border 
conflicts (Israeli-West Bank barrier) or as a protection of the state’s territory against 
terrorism or organized crime. However, the size and expansion of the Turkish 
fortification moved several authors, organizations and media (The Daily Express, 
Sputnik New, Immigration Talk) to refer to this construction as the Great Wall of 
Turkey, as a parallel to the Great Wall of China (which is surely an exaggeration 
when comparing the actual range of the Turkish barrier and the Chinese wall). 
Limitation of the content and selective approach to the dimensions influencing 
change of the Turkish border policy to the three abovementioned factors was an 
unavoidable step based upon limited range of the article, as well as the scope of the 
entire migration related policies in Turkey, which are result of a complex interplay 
between security, humanitarian, social, political and economic dimensions in the 
country. There are certainly many other factors shaping the Turkish shift to the more 
restrictive border policy. These include change in numbers of refugees and people 
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seeking international protection coming to Turkey between 2011 and nowadays 
with regard to the capacity swamping and lack of financial resources as potential 
factors influencing closure of Turkish borders; but also Turkish public opinion, 
which has shifted from perceiving Turkish open border policy as a manifestation 
of solidarity and Turkish dominance in the region, to seeing Syrian refugees as a 
threat to social order, economic growth and security. Analysis of these and other 
domestic factors influencing Turkish migration is a topic of other already existing 
articles and studies4, and therefore will not be included in the presented paper.
Migration and regime in the Turkish borderland, 2011-2017
According to the latest statistics from October 2017, Turkey hosts the 
world largest refugee population of 3,5 million persons. Most of these people are 
Syrian nationals (3,2 million), followed by the Afghans (145,000), Iraqis (140,000) 
and Iranians (32,000; UNHCR 2017: 1) Influx of the Syrian refugees to Turkey, 
which followed after an outbreak of the Syrian civil war, was markedly supported by 
the Turkish Government, that reacted in contrary to the usual countries’ approach 
towards foreign population trying to cross the state borders5. Turkey did not close 
its borders, nor did it made any attempts to intercept or halt people from Syria 
who reached the Turkish territory irregularly. Although the numbers of migrants 
from Syria in the first group of arrival did not reach more than 300 people, the 
Government „...characterised the incident as a situation of „mass influx” and took 
measures to treat the arrivals outside the framework of Turkey’s asylum system at 
4 See for example: Memisoglu, F., Ilgit, A. (2016).
5 Two other Middle Eastern countries strongly affected by the inflow of the Syrian migrants in 
terms of numbers are Lebanon (995 512 persons of concern as of February 2018) and Jordan 
(657 628 persons of concern as of February 2018; UNHCR 2018:1). Both of them introduced 
policy of solidarity towards Syrian nationals seeking international protection over the first 
months of the crisis. Yet, unlike Turkey, after the numbers of fleeing people started to rise, 
both countries implemented more restrictive migration policy to protect the physical and 
socio-economical security on their own territories. Jordan, for example, hosted nearly 2000 
Syrian refugees by the end of 2011, but already 15000 in August 2012, which resulted in a 
change of the Jordanian refugee policy towards Syrians between 2012-2013. In 2011, the 
Syrians seeking „...asylum and access to UNHCR’s services in Jordan are automatically 
recognized as prima facie refugees under the framework of a Jordan-UNHCR Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) signed in 1998 - Syrians are not required to undergo a refugee status 
determination process and are thus afforded protection and access to subsidized primary 
health care and other essential services. Yet, entries to Jordan were quickly restricted, first for 
the Palestinian and Iraqi refugees from Syria as of 2012, and later in 2013, for all Syrians” (De 
Bel Air 2016: 2). In particular, since mid-2013, Jordan has restricted access of Syrians to its 
territory by not admitting refugees to cross Jordanian official border crossing points Daraa 
and Nasib at the northwestern borders and informally also the entire Jordan-Syrian border, 
although this has been denied by the Jordanian officials (Francis 2015: 1).
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the time, which was envisioned to process individually arriving protection seekers“ 
(AIDA 2017: 1) The main piece of legislation governing matters of asylum at the 
time was the 1994 Asylum Regulation. Article 13 of the law stated, that mass influx 
of refugees was to be „halted at the border line” and „not allowed to reach Turkey’s 
territory”, unless there is „Governmental instruction to the contrary”. Yet, with 
regard to the situation in Syria, the Government did provide such instruction as 
referred to in Article 13. In October 2011, Turkey’s Minister of Interior announced 
during a UNHCR-hosted conference in Geneva that Turkey was implementing 
a „temporary protection” regime to refugees from Syria loosely inspired by the 
EU Temporary Protection Directive6. This policy was based on three core principles 
(AIDA 2017: 1):
1. Turkey’s borders shall remain open to persons seeking safety in Turkey;
2. No persons from Syria shall be sent back to Syria against their will;
3. Basic humanitarian needs of the persons arriving from the conflict in Syria shall 
be met.
However, temporary protection in Turkey was not based on any existing 
law in the state. It was an ad hoc measure, whose implementation depended 
solely on political and administrative discretions, leading to changing practices 
in regards to implementation aspects such as admission to territory, registration, 
access to shelter or access to health care. The Temporary Protection Regime was 
formalized only on 22 October 2014 by the Regulation on Temporary Protection. 
According to this law, Syrian citizens are granted temporary protection after 
registration at the Directorate General on Migration Management – DGMM 
that was established in 2014 in line with The Law on Foreigners and International 
Protection – LRIP. This generous approach towards Syrian migrants was allegedly 
part of the Turkish intentions to enhance country’s regional influence by acting as 
a democratic and responsible actor, showing off its solidarity with the people in 
need on one hand, and economic power by giving them shelter and basic needs, on 
the other hand. Besides, the open-door policy was shaped by the newly introduced 
6 The Temporary Protection Directive 2001/55/EC was adopted as a reaction to the Kosovo 
migration crisis in 1999. According to Article 1, the purpose of the Directive is „to establish 
minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of 
displaced persons from third countries who are unable to return to their country of origin 
and to promote a balance of effort between Member States in receiving and bearing the 
consequences of receiving such persons“ (Council Directive 2001/55/EC 2001: 3). The 
protection is granted for the period of 1 year (with a  possibility of prolongation) and is 
effective in cases of mass influx, when reviewing individual asylum applications would be 
time-consuming or impossible due to lack of capacities and human sources in the receiving 
countries. Yet, the Directive has never been implemented in the EU so far.
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„zero-problems with neighbours policy” architected by Ahmet Davutoğlu after 
the Justice and Development Party (AKP) power takeover in 2002. According to 
Davutoğlu, the zero-problems approach is based on the notion that „Turkey needs 
to improve its relations with all its neighbours by rescuing itself from the belief 
that it is constantly surrounded by enemies and the defensive reflex developing 
thereof ” (Yeşiltaş and Balcı 2013: 9). This policy was closely related with changed 
perception of Turkish borders. They started to be treated as lines of contact instead 
of barriers – the notion, that brought (among other things) liberalisation of visa 
policies with the neighbouring countries and softening of the border regimes.
Despite the initial proclamation that Turkish borders shall remain 
open to persons seeking safety in Turkey and the statements made by President 
Erdoğan, such as the one from March 13, 2016, that „... Ankara’s open-door policy 
for Syrian refugees will continue due to the responsibility coming from Islamic 
civilization, contrary to Western hypocrisy” (Daily Sabah 2016: 1), most of the 
official border crossings at the Turkey-Syria borders in 2017 remain closed. Latest 
report of The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
from 1 November 2017 shows, that out of 19 crossing points between Syria and 
Turkey, 13 are closed, 3 are restricted and only 3 are opened (OCHA 2017: 1). 
Turkey occasionally opens some of the closed border-crossing points, usually at 
the times of important Muslim festivities7.
Except of closure of border crossing points and the erection of the wall 
on the Turkey-Syria border, the third step in the process that led to the creation 
of what is now known as Fortress Turkey was adoption of the new visa regime 
towards Syria. On 8 January 2016, Turkey reversed its 2009 agreement that allowed 
visa-free entry of Syrians to Turkey and introduced visa requirements for Syrians 
arriving in Turkey by air and sea from other countries. Syrians entering Turkey 
by land from the Syrian territory don’t need to apply for visa; yet it does not mean 
that they are admitted to the Turkish territory automatically, as it was the case 
before October 2014. The Regulation on Temporary Protection „does not explicitly 
guarantee the right of access to Turkish territory for prospective beneficiaries. As 
per Article 17 TPR, which governs matters of admission to territory, „persons 
7 For example, on June 30, 2016, Turkey opened the Cilvegozu/Bab al-Hawa border crossing in 
the province of Hatay to allow Syrians to return home for the Eid al-Fitr festival, which began 
on July 5. At least 34,000 Syrians used this opportunity to cross into Syria, yet, they were 
required to return to Turkey by July 8. Moreover, no Syrians who wanted to get to Turkey 
for the first time or the ones without valid Turkish registration cards were allowed to cross 
the border during this period (DRC 2016: 15). Similarly, over 47,000 Syrians applied for the 
permission to leave Turkey temporarily in early September to travel to Syria for the Eid al-
Adha holiday. They were obliged to return to Turkey by 15 October (MMP 2017a: 11).
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approaching Turkey’s borders without a valid travel document may or may not be 
admitted to territory within the discretion of the provincial Governorate“ (AIDA 
2018: 1). As further explained in Article 15, the Board of Ministers can limit and 
suspend admission of temporary protection, or even seal Turkish borders for 
people seeking temporary protection in case they find it necessary as a matter of 
national security, public order, public security or public health (AIDA 2018: 1).
Table 1: Turkey/Syria Border Crossings Status (1 November 2017)
Name Status Province in Turkey Province in Syria
Yayladağı/Kasab Closed Hatay Lattakia
Kızılçat/Samira Closed Hatay Lattakia
Topraktutan/Yunesiya Closed Hatay Lattakia
Aşşağıpulluyazı/Einal-Bayda Restricted Hatay Idleb
Güveççi/Kherbet Eljoz Restricted Hatay Idleb
Şanlı/Darkoush Closed Hatay Idleb
Dostluk Köprüsü/Friendship Bridge Closed Hatay Idleb
Cilvegözü/Bab al-Hawa Opened Hatay Idleb
Bükülmez/Atmeh Restricted Hatay Idleb
Islahiye/MaydanAkbis Closed Gaziantep Aleppo
Öncüpınar/Bab al-Salam Opened Kilis Aleppo
Çobanbey/Al-Ra’ee Closed Kilis Aleppo
Karkamış/Jarabulus Opened Gaziantep Aleppo
Mürşitpınar/Ainal Arab Closed Sanliurfa Aleppo
Akçakale/Tell Abyad Closed Sanliurfa Ar-Raqa
Ceylanpınar/Rasal-Ain Closed Sanliurfa Al Hasakeh
Şenyurt/Derbassiyeh Closed Mardin Al Hasakeh
Nusaybin/Qamishly Closed Mardin Al Hasakeh
Çavuşköy/AinDiwar Closed Sirnak Al Hasakeh
Source: (OCHA 2017: 1).
Building “Fortress Turkey”: Factors of Change
The concept of „Fortress” has been most commonly used as an allegoric 
term with regard to the European migration policy and was referring to reluctant 
attitude and tricky legislative process that third-country nationals had to go 
through before they were allowed to enter the EU territory. However, construction 
of the wall at the Turkish borders changed this perception and the metaphor has 
acquired a physical form. Following part of the paper will debate possible reasons 
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leading to change of the Turkish open-borders policy by categorizing them into 
three groups.
Territorial integrity, sovereignty and geopolitics
For a  long time, Turkey struggled with border and sovereignty issues 
regarding the Turkish border province Hatay, but also regarding Kurdish 
separatism. Hatay has been part of the Ottoman Empire as Sanjak Alexandretta. 
After dissolution of the empire, the Sévres Treaty from 1921, as well as the 
Lausanne Treaty from 1923 placed Alexandretta under the French Mandate of 
Syria. As noted by Khater (2010: 177), the population of Alexandretta in 1921 
was composed of 220,000 people – mostly Arabs, and only 87,000 of them were 
Turks. In November 1937, after complaints over mistreatment of the Turkish 
population, the League of Nations brokered autonomy of Alexandretta, and the 
province proclaimed independence on 2 September 1938 following outbreak of 
the Second World War8. The government of the newly established Hatay9 state was 
under Turkish supervision and within several months, on 29 June 1939, Hatay 
became a Turkish province following a referendum. However, Syria never formally 
recognized Turkish claims. First of all, the 1939 referendum itself was controver-
sial – Turkey trucked citizens originally from Hatay to vote in the referendum, 
whereas Arabs boycotted the vote because they found it irregular. And second of 
all, at the times of the Ottoman Empire, Alexandretta has been part of the Vilayet 
of Aleppo in Syrian part of the land. After the AKP power takeover in Turkey in 
2002 and ruling of Bashar al-Assad in Syria since 2000, relations between the two 
countries normalized and the issue of Hatay was almost solved when the countries 
agreed on construction of a shared Friendship Dam on the Orontes River. Yet, 
outbreak of the Syrian civil war reversed the process. Due to its proximity to the 
Syrian border, most of the Turkish camps for the Syrian migrants are located in 
the Hatay region, providing shelter to around 402,000 officially registered refugees 
8 Most historians claim, that France agreed to cede Hatay to Turkey despite the fact, that 
majority of the population was Arabic, to persuade Turkey to join Allies against Germany in 
the Second World War (Khater 2010: 177).
9 The name Hatay is derived from the „Hittites“ – an ancient people living in Anatolia 
between 1600 B.C. – 1178 B.C. Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and establishment of 
an independent Republic of Turkey was connected with the process of nation building, 
searching for the Turkish roots and efforts to justify Turkish territorial claims in Anatolia 
by pointing to historical tradition of Turkish presence in the region. This led to creation of 
several pseudoscientific theories. One of them presumed that the Turks are related to some 
ancient peoples of Anatolia such as the Sumerians and Hittites. In reality, the Turks first 
appeared in Anatolia after the Muslim conquest in the 7th century and more intensively in 
the 11th century when the Seljuk Turks captured Baghdad.
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(GRI 2017: 1). This changed demographic structure of the 1,5 million population 
in the area in favour of Syria. Besides, not only inflow of Syrian migrants alone, 
but also reactions of the domestic population in Hatay to this phenomenon pose 
risk of separation of the region from Turkey. Most of the Alawites in Hatay are at 
odds with the ruling AKP party; support opposition Republican People’s Party 
(CHP) and carry strong pro-Assad current. Therefore, they are strongly against 
Turkish support to political and military Syrian opposition - the Syrian National 
Council and the Free Syrian Army, which established its command in Hatay in 
October 2011. As noted by Cagaptay (2013: 1): „After Ankara began providing safe 
haven to Syrian opposition groups and armed rebels in fall 2011, Hatay Alawites 
grew even more critical of the AKP’s policies. They have played a disproportiona-
tely large role in anti-AKP rallies, including a March 9 demonstration that drew 
two thousand people and a late-2012 protest attended by some eight thousand“. In 
order to ease the Alawites-Sunni tension, Turkey responded by transferring some 
Sunni refugees from the Hatay province to the other regions in September 2012.
Worries about separation of Hatay due to inflow of Syrian migrants 
are intensified by another separatist group threatening Turkish sovereignty – the 
Kurds. Hatay borders the Syrian Afrin Canton, which is the far western canton of 
the resurgent Syrian Kurdish movement’s semi-autonomous region Rojava (The 
Democratic Federation of Northern Syria) established in November 2013. Fragile 
ceasefire between the Kurds in Turkey represented by The Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party (PKK) and the government, which was established on 21 March 2013, 
was abandoned in July 2015 and the Turkey-PKK conflict escalated again to the 
level of war in 2016 with regard to the alleged lack of engagement of the Turkish 
government to protect the Kurds in Turkey from the Daesh attacks (bomb attack in 
Suruc on July 20 which killed 33 mainly Kurdish civilians; UCDP 2017: 1). Radical 
PKK supporters used the open-door policy to enter Turkey from Syria and Syrian 
Kurds coming to Turkey encouraged separatist ambitions of the most radical 
Turkish Kurds and boosted the PKK insurgency in Turkey. This is undermined by 
the fact, that PKK is composed largely from Syrian nationals as a consequence of 
the historical development of the organization – in the 1980’s Syrian government 
allowed PKK to operate training camps on Syrian territory and perform attacks 
on the then adversarial Turkish regime. As noted by Holland-McCowan (2017: 9): 
„It is estimated that between seven to ten thousand Syrian Kurds joined the PKK 
during that period and they currently comprise approximately one third of the 
PKK’s forces“.
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Terrorism and organized crime
The second group of factors explaining change of the Turkish open-borders 
policy includes increase of organized crime activities and infiltration of terrorists 
and radical fighters due to the ongoing conflict in Syria to the Turkish territory. 
Currently, there is no universal list of activities, which fall under the definition 
of organized crime. However, Interpol defines transnational organized crime as 
different types of criminal activities spanning several countries. „These activities 
may include trafficking in humans, illicit goods, weapons and drugs, armed 
robbery, counterfeiting and money laundering” (Interpol 2015: 1). According to 
the Turkey’s Customs and Trade Ministry, the amount of seized goods in 2014 was 
valued at over $ 600 million, which is a nearly 50% increase over 2013 figures. Out 
of the activities listed above, organized crime in Turkey includes mostly money 
laundering, smuggling of narcotics, gasoline, and tobacco from Syria and Iraq to 
Turkey. Most of them recorded increase in the last few years due to the migration 
waves that facilitate illegal transfer of materials, goods and persons via state 
borders, especially in situations of open-borders regime as introduced by Turkey 
in 2011.  Examples include (GRI 2015: 1):
1. Counterfeiting – which relates most commonly to Syrian nationals, who bring 
counterfeit American and Turkish currency into Turkey, especially in the southern 
regions. In February 2015, Turkey recorded largest anti-counterfeit dollar operation 
in a decade, which netted $11 million in fake money.
2. Smuggling of drugs – in case of narco-trafficking, the drug Captagon – an 
amphetamine widely consumed in the Persian Gulf, comes to the forefront. Turkey 
is usually only a transit country used to move this drug from Lebanon into the Gulf 
countries. The Turkish-Iranian border is also an important transit route of drug 
smuggling. It is used mostly to transport cannabis and heroin from Afghanistan 
and Pakistan to Europe.
3. Hydrocarbon and gasoline – Turkish authorities regularly discover newly 
built pipelines used by the smugglers to move gasoline from Syria into Turkey. 
It is a  lucrative business due to high fuel taxes in Turkey, which opens up black 
market for illegal imports of gasoline from Syria to Turkey. Daesh members 
supply Turkish black market with illegal gas from the occupied Syrian regions to 
finance their activities and construct many pipelines in the territories under their 
control, mostly leading to the regions of Kilis, Urfa and Gaziantep, Hakkari and 
Hatay. Only in 2014, 50 million litres of illegal gasoline were confiscated by the 
Turkish authorities.
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However, organized crime in Turkey does not relate only to the afore-
mentioned substances and war-related materials, but includes many other goods 
of broad consumption, as the conflict in Syria completely shut down the land trade 
between the two countries in the provinces Aleppo and Hatay. As noted by Hikmet 
Çinçin, President of the Antakya Chamber of Trade and Industry (ATSO): „In 
2008 our exports from Hatay to Syria were $123 million, they were $186 million 
in 2009, $250 million in 2010, $150 million in 2011, but ... they are nearly zero in 
2012” (Antakya 2012: 1). Syria was also a transit route for Turkish exports to the 
Gulf countries. Nowadays, Turkey prefers to use a  sea route using ferries from 
the port of İskenderun to Egypt or further via the Suez Canal to Saudi Arabia, as 
this is considered to be safer than transfer via Syria (GRI 2017). Closure of official 
land-trade routes naturally leads up to creation of illegal channels and increase in 
organized crime activities in the region.
Figure 1: No. of terrorist attacks (with fatalities) in Turkey (2003-2017*)
* 2017 data includes only the nightclub incident from 1 January.
Source: (Ser 2016: 1).
Worries from the conflict spillover in terms of infiltration of foreign 
fighters to the Turkish territory or radicalization of domestic population are 
another potential factor influencing construction of the border walls. Statistics 
on terrorism10 in Turkey show a  radical increase in number of terrorist attacks 
10 The Global Terrorism Database defines terrorism as „the threatened or actual use of illegal 
force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal 
through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (GTD 2017: 1).
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in Turkey in 2012, and then in 2015 and 2016 (see Figure 1). However, these are 
related not only with activities of the Daesh fighters or Syrian radicals coming 
in the migration waves from Syria to Turkey, but also with development of the 
PKK-Turkey relations. In 2011, number of attacks increased following collapse of 
the secret talks between the Kurds and the government in Ankara. The figures were 
low between 2013 and 2015, yet rose again after ceasefire between the two actors 
was abandoned in July 2015. Thus, it is not possible to link increase in terrorist 
attacks in Turkey solely and exclusively with the conflict in Syria and terrorism 
cannot be treated as a decisive factor for build-up of border barriers.
Foreign policy and international pressure
As a NATO member state, Ankara has long been under pressure from its 
allies to seal off the border with Syrian territories controlled by the Islamic State. In 
the initial years, Ankara remained reluctant to become a part of a U.S.-led military 
coalition11 created in September 2014 to fight the Daesh and the government was 
criticized for its benign border regime and alleged support for Daesh. The reason 
for Turkish aversion to join the fight on the US side was cooperation between the 
Coalition and the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its military wing 
the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) with regard to the aforemen-
tioned Kurdish issue in Turkey. PYD is considered to be a PKK proxy organization12 
established in Syria after the Adana Agreement from 1998, where Syria agreed to 
halt sheltering of PKK fighters and the organization was forced to establish offshoot 
political party under different name to retain its influence in Syria. Turkey was 
worried by the fact, that the PYD was able to control large parts of territory in the 
north of Syria, which prompted the PKK in Turkey to start an insurgency against 
the government after collapse of the ceasefire in July 2015. Instead of joining 
the US coalition, Turkey continued to support Arab and Turkmen anti-Assad 
opposition groups, which were deemed as part of the radical Islamist scene in Syria. 
Cooperation between the Global Coalition and the PYD/YPG has turned into an 
existential threat to Turkey on 9 May 2017 after President Trump approved a plan 
to provide the Kurdish fighters of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)13 with heavy 
11 The Global Coalition; currently composed of 73 states.
12 Despite the claims of the PYD leadership, that their relationship with the PKK is rather 
ideological than institutional, the original charter of the PYD put Abdullah Öcalan (PKK 
founder) as PYD’s official leader (McCowan 2017: 9).
13 SDF was created in cooperation between the USA and YPG in October 2015 to bypass 
Turkish pressure on Washington to stop backing the PKK linked YPG, and to alleviate Arab 
concern about the coalition’s reliance on Kurdish troops. SFD was built from the already 
existing group called Euphrates Volcano, which was created by the YPG in September 2014. 
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machine guns, mortars, anti-tank weapons, and armoured cars for their assault on 
Raqqa. Despite US reassurance, that the weapons will be monitored, Turkey feared 
that they will fall under the control of the PKK militants and will be used against 
them. This development created a paradoxical situation, where NATO countries, 
which should protect each other’s territorial integrity from armed attack by a third 
party (Article 4 and 5 of the Washington Treaty) started to equip Kurdish groups, 
who were threatening Turkish sovereignty and territorial integrity, with arms and 
weaponry (Altunışık 2016: 43; Holland-McCowan 2017: 9-13). In this regard, new 
Turkish security arrangements in the borderland and erection of a fenced wall can 
be understood as a Turkish attempt to comply with the demands of its NATO allies 
to engage in the fight against Daesh and in this way remove the US need for further 
militarization of other US non-state allies adversarial to Turkey, particularly the 
Kurdish organizations PKK, YPG, PYD and SDF. 
Concerning impact of the relations with the EU on creating the Fortress 
Turkey, a critical role has the EU-Turkish Agreement from 18 March 2016 that 
took effect on the 20 March 2016. A decisive impact on built-up of a border wall 
has the part stating that irregular migrants, who came from Turkey to Greece after 
20 March and won’t apply for asylum, or who apply for asylum in the EU, but in 
the asylum procedure, will be determined as arriving from a country where they 
had or could have claimed protection – a „safe third country” or „first country 
of asylum”, will be returned to Turkey following the legal provisions of a bilateral 
readmission agreement between Turkey and Greece that is to be succeeded by the 
EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement from 1 June 2016. In the second half on 2017, 
numbers of arrivals by sea from Turkey to Greece were increasing, with 9,286 
arrivals to Greece in the first six months of 2017 and 10,719 arrivals to Greece only 
between July and September 2017 (Collett 2016: 1; MMP 2017b: 9). Thus, build-up 
of a border wall can be seen as an attempt to secure the EU-Turkish border, to 
comply with the Agreement from 2016 and to avoid inflow of returnees composed 
of illegitimate asylum seekers sent back to Turkey from the EU member states.
Conclusion
The description that creates a parallel between the Turkish barrier and 
the Great Wall of China is easy to understand and requires no further explanation. 
The metaphor is being used as an over-comparison and it is unlikely, that this 
figurative appeal would turn into reality. What needs to be explained, however, 
is the process and causes of the radical change of the Turkish border policy and 
The SDF is composed of both Arab and Kurdish fighters (Holland-McCowan 2017: 9-10).
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migration regime towards Syria. The takeover of power by the AKP in 2002 meant 
among others change of the perception of the term „border”. After introduction 
of the „zero problems with neighbours” policy, Turkey initiated the process of 
visa-liberalisation with the neighbouring countries and the importance of border 
understood as a barrier has declined. This is reflected in the Turkish open-door 
policy towards Syrian refugees in the initial phases of the crisis, when the country did 
not introduce any strict border controls; the registration of Syrians was performed 
on the ad hoc basis and even people crossing the borders irregularly without any 
valid travel documents were not halted by the local officials and were allowed to 
move freely across the country. However, duration and further development of 
the Syrian migration crisis and war in the state created a new and revived old 
security threats that forced Turkey to redefine its perception of the state borders. 
Mass migration waves opened new channels for the traffickers of illicit goods, arms 
and other substances. The Daesh fighters have also used Turkish policy of opened 
borders to spread their activity to the Turkish territory. Syrian civil war awakened 
stifled issue of Hatay and its territorial ties with Syria. Besides, an engagement of 
the Kurds in the conflict and reinforcement of their positions in Rojava revived the 
separatist movement of the Kurdish minority in Turkey. The combination of the 
stated factors, threats to internal security and territorial integrity forced Turkey 
to reverse its border policy and return to the traditional concept of borders as 
barriers rather than places of contact. This occurred continuously in three stages – 
first, closure of official border crossings; second, introduction of visa requirements 
for Syrian citizens and third, build-up of walls along the borders with Syria, Iran 
and Iraq, which earned the label of the Great Wall of Turkey. This development 
implies that the treatment of borders as either places of contact or division keeps 
on changing dynamically and depends on various external factors that are hardly 
predictable in advance.
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Wielki Mur Turecki: od polityki 
otwartych drzwi do budowy fortecy?
Streszczenie:
W następstwie wybuchu wojny w Syrii w 2011 r., Turcja odnotowała bezprecedensowy 
napływ imigrantów z tego południowego kraju sąsiedzkiego. Polityka otwartych 
granic prowadzona w okresie pierwszych lat wojny została zastąpiona sekurytyzacją 
polityki dotyczącej ochrony międzynarodowej i innych polityk, które kraje zazwyczaj 
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przyjmują w sytuacji kryzysu migracyjnego. Jednak wzrastająca liczba imigrantów 
z Syrii, pogorszenie relacji Turcji z rządem Assada oraz włączenie się Kurdów jako 
kolejnej ważnej strony w konflikcie syryjskim skutkowało zwrotem w tureckiej polityce 
granicznej. W 2014 r., prezydent Erdoğan rozpoczął budowę ponad 800-kilometrowego 
odcinka muru na granicy z Syrią wraz z zapowiedzią wzniesienia podobnych umocnień 
na granicach z Irakiem i Iranem w 2017. Głównym celem artykułu jest analiza rozwoju 
tureckiej polityki granicznej (w szczególności dotyczącej granicy z Syrią) w następstwie 
wydarzeń z 2011 r. oraz wskazanie czynników, które doprowadziły do przejścia od 
polityki gościnności do polityki wznoszenia „Tureckiej Fortecy”. W pierwszej części 
artykułu krótko podsumowana zostanie turecka polityka migracyjna. Nacisk położony 
zostanie na przedstawienie zmiany początkowo otwartego podejścia wobec migrantów 
z Syrii na obecny stan budowy murów na pograniczu z Syrią. Następnie, w artykule 
przedstawione zostaną wybrane czynniki, które wywołały to zjawisko. Obejmują one 
rozprzestrzenianie się terroryzmu i napływ bojowników z Daesh, którzy wykorzystywali 
łagodny reżim graniczny do rozszerzania swojej aktywności na tureckim terytorium, 
wzrost przemytu i nielegalnego handlu transgranicznego, obawy o rozprzestrzenianie się 
konfliktu, ale także kwestie integralności terytorialnej w związku ze wzrostem aktywności 
Kurdów w regionie.
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